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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
INVOLUNTARY PETITIONS . An involuntary Chapter 7
petition was filed against a corporate debtor by three
creditors. The debtor opposed the involuntary petition. Before
an order for relief was granted, one of the creditors filed a
stipulation, executed by the debtor, that the creditor was
granted relief from the automatic stay so that payment of a
loan could proceed by automatic withdrawal from the
debtor’s checking account. The debtor agreed to this
stipulation, which also provided that no other party would be
informed about the stipulation. The court held that the debtor
had no authority to entered into the stipulation during the
“gap period” between the filing of an involuntary petition and
the order for relief. The court held that the creditor would
have to seek relief from the automatic stay through a Section
362 motion after the order for relief and all interested parties
were notified. In re E.D. Wilkins Grain Co., 235 B.R. 647
(Bankr. E.D. Calif. 1999).
FEDERAL TAXATION     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY . The IRS had filed a federal tax lien
notice prior to the debtor’s filing for Chapter 7 and the lien
was effective for after-acquired property. On the date of the
bankruptcy petition filing, the debtor owned a contingent
interest in a trust. The interest was subject to a testamentary
power of appointment held by the income beneficiary. The
debtor listed the contingent interest in the bankruptcy
schedules. The debtor’s bankruptcy case was closed with no
distributions to creditors. After the bankruptcy case filing but
before the closing of the case, the trust income beneficiary
died with a will which appointed 3 percent of the trust corpus
to the debtor. The trustee obtained a reopening of the case to
include the bequeathed property and the IRS sought a secured
claim over a portion of the funds, based upon the tax lien.
The court held that the automatic stay prevented the tax lien
from attaching to any property acquired by the debtor post-
petition. However, the court held that the debtor’s contingent
interest had value on the date of the petition and allowed the
IRS a secured claim to the extent of that value, found to be
$1,000. In re Avis, 178 F.3d 718 (4th Cir. 1999).
POST-PETITION INTEREST . The debtor’s Chapter 12
plan provided for full payment of an unsecured priority tax
claim but did not provide for payment of any post-petition
interest on the claim. The debtor made all payments under the
plan and received a discharge. The IRS sought collection of
post-petition interest on the claim and the debtor. The debtor
argued that the IRS was bound by the res judicata effect of
the bankruptcy plan and discharge. The court cited In re
Bossert, 201 B.R. 553 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1996) and In re
Mitchell, 210 B.R. 978 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997, aff’d, unrep.
D. Ct. dec. (N.D. Tex. 1997) in holding that the IRS was not
entitled to post-petition interest. In re Cousins, 236 B.R. 119
(Bankr. D. N.H. 1999).
TAX LIENS . The IRS had filed a federal tax lien notice
prior to the debtor’s filing for Chapter 11 and the lien was
effectiv  for after-acquired property. The bankruptcy trustee
btained additional property for the estate through avoidance
of pr ferential transfers. The IRS argued that the recovered
property was subject to its tax lien. The court held that the tax
lien did not attach to the recovered property because the
recovered property was not owned by the debtor after the
recovery. The court held that the recovered property
immediately became estate property. In e Southeast
Railroad Contractors, Inc., 235 B.R. 619 (Bankr. E.D.
Te n. 1996).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
CLEAN WATER ACT.  The plaintiffs owned property
which contained ponds which were located downhill from the
defendant’s property. The defendant conducted timber
harvesting operations on the defendant’s land, including
building roads and culverts. The timber operations caused
extra water to drain onto the plaintiffs’ properties and
eventually into a river. The draining water carried soil
erosion into the ponds and the river and the plaintiffs sued for
violations of the Clean Water Act. The defendant did not file
for any state or federal permits until much of the work had
been done, although the defendant could not have obtained
some permits because the permits were unavailable for
various reasons. The defendant argued that the unavailability
of the permits excused the defendant from any violations. In
addition, the defendant argued that (1) there was no point
source of the erosion, (2) the soil erosion was not a pollutant
covered by the Act and (3) the erosion was not discharged
into navigable water. The court rejected a complete exception
where no permits were available at the time of discharge but
reiterated its holding in Hughey v. JMS Development Corp.,
78 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996), that a exception would apply
if (1) it was impossible to meet the zero-discharge standard,
(2) no permit was available for the discharge, (3) the
discharge was in good faith compliance with local rules, and
(4) the discharges were minimal. The court found that factors
(1) and (4) did not exist in this case because the defendant did
nothing to minimize the discharge and the discharge of
rosion was substantial and continuing. Therefore, the court
held that the defendant’s inability to obtain a permit did not
excuse the defendant from liability for discharges in violation
of the Act. The court also held that (1) soil erosion was a
pollutant covered by the act, (2) the culverts were point
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sources covered by the Act, and (3) the streams and rivers
which received the erosion were navigable waters covered by
the Act. Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999).
SWEET CORN LEACHATE . The defendant processing
of sweet corn produced a large amount of silage which it
gave to area farmers. During loading and transporting the
silage, silage leachate was spilled onto the land and drained
into a neighboring lake on which the plaintiff resided. In an
earlier case, Cirpi v. Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc., 539
N.W.2d 526 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), the leachate was held to
be a hazardous substance governed by the former Michigan
Environmental Response Act (MERA) (now part of the
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act). The
jury awarded $90,000 in damages but the trial court did not
order the defendant to restore the lake. On appeal, the
appellate court upheld the trial court’s refusal because the
evidence showed that the lake was recovering naturally and
because the lower jury award indicated that the jury believed
that the lake was not permanently damaged. The court also
held that the defendant was strictly liable for the discharge of
leachate because the defendant “arranged” for the disposal of
the silage to area farmers. The trial court had ruled that the
defendant did not dispose of the silage but was “using” the
silage by giving it to area farmers. The appellate court noted
that the silage was waste to the defendant and the donation
process was its means of disposing of the silage; therefore,
the defendant was strictly liable for the resulting
environmental contamination.  C rpi v. Bellingham Frozen
Foods, Inc., 596 N.W.2d 620 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CATTLE . The AMS is soliciting comments on a proposal
to revise the United States Standards for Grades of Feeder
Cattle. Specifically, USDA is proposing to adjust the
minimum requirements for the three thickness grades to
accommodate thicker muscled cattle and reflect current
marketing practices. Additionally, the AMS is proposing to
adjust the frame size parameters to reflect the genetic changes
that have taken place in the cattle population since 1979
when the current standards were adopted. Industry and other
groups, including state Departments of Agriculture that
officially grade feeder cattle for marketing programs,
requested that these changes be made. All other grade aspects
of the current standards will remain unchanged. 64 Fed. Reg.
51501 (Sept. 23, 1999).
FARM LOANS . The debtors had obtained FmHA (now
FSA) farm loans which were secured by dairy cows. The
original security agreement listed 78 cows as collateral out of
a herd of 114 cows. The FmHA did two collateral inspections
and found the herd reduced to 82 head and then reduced to
zero, with both reductions made without prior consent of the
FmHA. The FmHA ordered the debtors to either replace the
missing cows or pay the FmHA for their value. The debtors
did not comply with the order until one year later and made
an application for another loan. The FmHA denied this
pplication on the basis of the debtors’ lack of good faith
because of the sale of the collateral-cows without prior
consent and failure to comply timely with the collateral
replacement order. The court upheld the loan denial on the
basis of the debtors’ lack of good faith as evidenced by the
sale of the collateral-cows without paying the proceeds to the
FmHA or obtaining prior consent for the sale. Bryant v.
Secretary, USDA, 227 B.R. 89 (W.D. Va. 1998). The debtor
also filed for Chapter 11 and sought to relitigate the above
issues in the bankruptcy case. The court held that the debtors
could not relitigate the issue because the debtors had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
proceeding. In re Bryant, 235 B.R. 581 (W.D. Va. 1998).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT . T  plaintiffs were producers who sold agricultural
produce to the defendant. The defendant failed to timely pay
for the produce and the plaintiffs filed notice of intent to
preser  their rights to the PACA trust. The defendant was
threatened with bankruptcy and the plaintiffs entered into
post-d fault agreements to allow installment payments for the
produce. The defendant’s PACA license was revoked and the
efendant failed to make all the payments. The plaintiffs
sou ht to enforce their rights to the PACA trust but the
defe dant argued that the installment payment agreements
disqualified the plaintiffs for the PACA trust because the
agreem nts allowed for payments beyond 30 days after
delivery of the produce. The trial court had held that the
plaintiffs were not made ineligible for the PACA trust by the
installment agreements because the plaintiffs were eligible
for the trust when notice of intent to preserve their rights was
filed. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the plaintiffs
would be eligible for the PACA trust funds only if the
payments for the produce were due within the 30 days after
delivery at the time the plaintiffs attempted to enforce their
rights in the trust. Because the installment agreements
preceded the suit to enforce the PACA trust, the plaintiffs
were ineligible for the trust funds. Greg Orchards &
Produce, Inc. v. Roncone, 180 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 1999).
WETLANDS . The plaintiff owned farm land which was
drained by a ditch along the edge of the plaintiff’s land. Prior
to 1985, the plaintiff dredged the ditch to remove
accumulated soil and other obstructions. The dredging had
the effect of preventing flooding of the plaintiff’s land and
allowing the plaintiff to grow crops on the land. In 1986, the
county repaired a culvert through which the ditch flowed,
lowering the culvert by 18 inches. In 1987, the ditch had
become obstructed again and the plaintiff sought to dredge
the ditch again, but the USDA ruled that the ditch could not
be dredged below a point 18 inches above the culvert, the low
point of the ditch before the effective date of the
Swampbuster Act, December 23, 1985. The USDA-approved
level would produce flooding on the plaintiff’s land and
prevent the growing of crops. The USDA determination was
based solely on the lowering of the culvert by 18 inches and
di  not include any findings of the status of the ditch prior to
Decemb r 23, 1985. The court held that basing the
det rmination solely on the location of the culvert was
arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. The court
noted that the USDA determination focused only on the
status of the ditch which was not a protected wetland under
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the Act. The court held that the burden was on the USDA to
demonstrate that the plaintiff’s dredging would exceed the
dredging which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act
and remanded the case to the administrative level for a
USDA determination of the character of the land and the
plaintiff’s use of the land prior to the Act. Barthel v.
U.S.D.A., 181 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 1999).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS . The
decedent’s estate included a trust which became irrevocable
on the decedent’s death and included shares for the
decedent’s children. The estate sought to allocate the GST
exemption amounts but the executors did not comply with the
instructions on Form 706 for making the allocations. A
Schedule R was not filed with the Form 706. However, the
executors attached a copy of the trust document to the federal
estate tax return that was filed. The IRS ruled that the trust
agreement provided sufficient information as to the intended
GST allocation to satisfy the GST allocation election
requirements. Ltr. Rul. 9937026, June 17, 1999.
GIFTS . The taxpayers were four brothers, three of whom
were married, who owned stock in a family business. The
married couples gave stock to their own three children and to
each of their nieces and nephews, with each gift valued at just
below the annual exclusion amount of $10,000. Thus, each
child received the same total amount of stock. The fourth
brother gave stock to all the nephews and nieces, although
that brother had no children. Each brother and wife claimed
an annual exclusion for each gift. The court held that the gifts
were reciprocal gifts, causing the gifts from the aunt and
uncle to be attributed to the parent of the donee nieces and
nephews. Therefore, the gift of stock to each child from an
aunt or uncle was combined with the gifts from their parents,
causing the total amount of the gifts above $10,000 to be
subject to gift tax. The court held that the nonreciprocal
nature of the fourth brother’s gifts did not affect the
reciprocal nature of the gifts made between the other
families. Sather v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-309.
INTEREST . The decedent’s property included a QTIP
trust which owned various business properties. The estate did
not have sufficient liquid assets to pay the federal estate tax
and the estate obtained several extensions because the
business properties were difficult to sell at a reasonable
value. The estate eventually transferred the properties to the
beneficiaries who placed the properties into personal trusts.
The trusts obtained loans secured by the properties and paid
the estate tax. The estate sought to keep the estate open for
the 20 year period of the loan so that the estate could claim
the loan interest as an administrative expense deduction. The
court held that the estate could not deduct the interest
payments because (1) the loan was made by the trust and not
the estate; (2) the property was owned by the trusts and not
the estate; (3) the estate had obtained several extensions in
which  sell the property and made its own decision to
distribut  the property instead of selling it; and (4) the loan
period was substantial. Lasarzig v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1999-307.
MARITAL DEDUCTION- ALM  § 5.04[3].* Under the
terms of the decedent’s will a QTIP trust was established for
the surviving spouse with the remainder passing to the
decedent’s child. The surviving spouse was entitled to all
trust income, payable at least annually for the spouse’s life
but the spouse did not have a general power of appointment
over trust principal. The spouse purchased the child’s
remainder interest for cash for the fair market value, then the
trustee distributed all of the trust principal to the spouse.  The
trust was terminated with the spouse holding assets equal in
value to the value of the original life interest in the trust and
the child held assets equal in value to the value of the
remainder interest. Under the terms of the transaction, the
spouse was reimbursed for the gift tax imposed on the
transaction. The IRS ruled that the spouse would be regarded
as making a gift equal to the greater of (1) the present value
of the remainder interest (i.e., the amount of the transfer
under I.R.C. § 2519 and Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(c)(1)), or
(2) the amount transferred by the spouse in exchange for the
remainder interest (pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 2511 and 2512).
However, the amount subject to gift tax must be adjusted to
reflect any reimbursement the spouse received under the
terms of the transaction for the gift tax imposed on the
transfer. Ltr. Rul. 9936036, June 14, 1999.
RETURNS. The IRS has released updated Form 706-NA
(Rev. September 1999), United States Estate (and
Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return, and instructions.
These documents are available at no charge and can be
obtained either (1) by calling the IRS's toll-free telephone
number, 1-800-829-3676; (2) via the World Wide Web at
http://www.irs.gov/prod/cover.html; (3) through FedWorld
on the Internet; or (4) by directly accessing the Internal
Revenue Information Services bulletin board at (703) 321-
8020.
VALUATION . In a 1993 ruling, the IRS had ruled that a
trust contained a qualified spousal annuity interest for
purposes of I.R.C. § 2702. The grantor of the trust also held a
testamentary power of appointment over the spousal annuity.
The ruling further provided that the power of appointment
was, itself, a qualified annuity interest. In this ruling, the IRS
reconsidered the earlier ruling and held that the spousal
annuity interest was not qualified; therefore, the grantor’s
power of appointment was not a qualified annuity interest.
Ltr. Rul. 9937043, Oct. 13, 1999, modifying, Ltr. Rul.
9352017, Sept. 30, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
AUTOMOBILES . The taxpayer corporation leased luxury
vehicles from another corporation. The vehicles are used
exclusively in the taxpayer’s security services business for
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transporting clients who hire the taxpayer to provide secure
transportation. The IRS ruled that (1) the vehicles were not
"passenger automobiles;" (2) the term "any other property
used as a means of transportation" did not apply to the
vehicles and, therefore, the vehicles were not "listed
property," and (3) because the vehicles were not passenger
automobiles or listed property within the meaning of I.R.C. §
280F(d), I.R.C. § 280F did not limit the taxpayers' deductions
for the vehicle. Ltr. Rul. 9936018, June 4, 1999.
CASUALTY LOSSES . The taxpayers owned citrus groves
which suffered freeze damage in 1983 and 1989. The
taxpayer claimed a casualty loss based upon permanent loss
of value of the land from an industry assessment that the land
was unsuitable for citrus groves due to the frequent freezes.
The court found, however, that the evidence demonstrated
only a temporary buyer resistance caused the drop in value of
the land; therefore, the court held that the taxpayer was not
eligible for a casualty loss deduction. The court noted that the
loss of value was not associated with any physical damage to
the property, only from buyer resistance which would remain
only so long as the freezes were in recent memory. Philmon
v. United States, 99-2 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,832 (M.D.
Fla. 1999).
CONSTRUCTION ALLOWANCES . The IRS has issued
proposed regulations concerning an exclusion from gross
income for qualified lessee construction allowances provided
by a lessor to a lessee for the purpose of constructing long-
lived property to be used by the lessee pursuant to a short-
term lease. The proposed regulations affect a lessor and a
lessee paying and receiving, respectively, qualified lessee
construction allowances that are depreciated by a lessor as
nonresidential real property and excluded from the lessee's
gross income. The proposed regulations provide guidance on
the exclusion, the information required to be furnished by the
lessor and the lessee, and the time and manner for providing
that information to the IRS. 64 Fed. Reg. 50783 (Sept. 20,
1999).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS . The
taxpayer’s employment was terminated and the taxpayer and
employer executed an agreement under which the taxpayer
released all claims against the employer in exchange for one
year’s salary and continuation of insurance benefits for one
year. The taxpayer had made no personal injury claim against
the employer and the agreement did not mention any specific
claim made by the taxpayer. The evidence showed that the
amounts paid were for severance pay and were based on
factors unrelated to any claims made by the taxpayer. The
court held that the termination agreement proceeds were
included in the taxpayer’s gross income. Pipitone v. United
States, 180 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 1999), aff’g, 17 F. Supp.2d
793 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
The taxpayer voluntarily participated in an early retirement
program. The employer required the taxpayer to sign a
release which included releasing the employer from any age
discrimination claims. The taxpayer excluded payments
under the program from income as settlement payments for
age discrimination claims. The court held that the payments
were included in income because (1) age discrimination
claims were not tort or tort-like claims and (2) the release was
not a settlement of an age discrimination claim. Manners v.
Unit d S ates, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,844 (Fed.
Cls. 1999).
DEPOSITS. The taxpayer operated a citrus grove and sold
trees to customers. Some customers were required to pay
deposits in advance of delivery. The taxpayer would refund
the deposit if delivery was not made. The taxpayer argued
that the deposits were not income until the trees were
delivered because the sales were not complete, given the
pos ibility that many events could occur to prevent the
delivery and that a refund would be made. The court held that
the dep its were income when paid because the taxpayer had
 right to the payment if delivery was made. The court
distingui hed such deposits from security deposits (which are
not income when paid) which were refundable when all
contract performance was completed. Philmon v. United
States, 99-2 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,832 (M.D. Fla.
1999).
DISASTER LOSSES. The president on Aug. 16, 1999,
determined that certain areas in Utah are eligible for
assistance from the federal government under the Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act as a result of a tornado,
severe thunderstorms and hail that began on Aug. 11, 1999.
Accordingly, a taxpayer in Salt Lake County who sustained a
loss attributable to the disaster can deduct the loss on a 1998
federal income tax return. FEMA-1285-DR. On Aug. 20,
1999, the president determined that certain areas in Nebraska
are eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of severe
torms and flooding that began on Aug. 6, 1999. Taxpayers in
the Burt, Douglas and Washington counties who sustained
los es attributable to the disaster may deduct them on their
1998 returns. FEMA-1286-DR. The president on Aug. 22,
1999, determined that certain areas in Texas are eligible for
assistanc  from the federal government under the Act as a
result of severe storms and flooding that began on Aug. 21,
1999. Accordingly, a taxpayer in Arsansas, Brooks,
Cameron, Duval, Jim Wells, Kenedy, Kleberg, Nueces, Webb
and Wallacy Counties who sustained a loss attributable to the
disaster can deduct the loss on his or her 1998 federal income
tax return. FEMA-1287-DR. The president on Aug. 22,
1999, determined that certain areas in Texas are eligible for
assistance from the federal government under the Act as a
result of severe storms and flooding on Aug. 21, 1999.
Accordingly, taxpayers in the counties of Hidalgo, San
Patricio and Jim Hogg who sustained a loss attributable to the
disaster may deduct the loss on their 1998 federal income tax
returns. FEMA-1288-DR. On Sept. 1, 1999, the president
determined that certain areas in Pennsylvania are eligible for
assistance from the federal government under the Act as a
result of severe storms and flooding on Aug. 20-21, 1999.
Taxpayers in McKean County who sustained a loss
attributable to the disaster may deduct the loss on their 1998
fed ral income tax returns. FEMA-1289-DR. The president
also determined on Sept. 6, 1999, that certain areas in
Virgini  are eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of
Tropical Storm Dennis and tornadoes on Aug. 27, 1999.
Taxpayers in the city of Hampton who sustained a loss
attributable to the disaster may deduct the loss on their 1998
federal income tax returns. FEMA-1290-DR.
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DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayers were
partners in a partnership which had discharge of indebtedness
income from renegotiation of a loan. The taxpayers did not
include their share of the discharge of indebtedness income
because the taxpayers claimed they were insolvent at the time
of the discharge. The taxpayers included in their personal
debts a guarantee of the partnership debt. However, the court
found that at the time of the discharge, it was more likely
than not that the taxpayers would not have to pay on the
guarantee. Therefore, the court held that the guarantee was
not includible in the taxpayers’ debts since the guarantee was
only a contingent debt. Merkel v. Comm’r, 99-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,848 (9th Cir. 1999), aff’g, 109 T.C. 463
(1997).
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS. In a 1993 field service advice,
the IRS discussed three challenges to providing deductible
medical insurance plans for spouse-employees. In the fact
situation discussed, the taxpayers, husband and wife made
use of a medical plan promotion scheme. The medical plan
attempted to establish an employer-employee relationship
between husband and wife owners of family farms. In the
typical situation, the husband is treated as the sole proprietor
of the Schedule F farming business. The wife is hired as an
employee of the sole proprietor and is provided with a fringe
benefit plan that includes medical insurance for the employee
and her dependents (including the husband/proprietor) or that
provides reimbursement for the spouse's and dependent's
medical costs. The plan promoter acts as the medical plan
administrator and performs various duties such as processing
claims and maintaining records. In addition, the plan
promoter provides documentation to form the employment
relationship between the husband and wife, including
employment agreements and tax forms. The plan promoter’s
promotional material relies on Rev. Rul. 71-588, 1971-2 C.B.
91, to advise potential clients that the expenses incurred by
the husband to pay for the medical plan are deductible under
I.R.C. §162 as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
Furthermore, the promotional material advises that amounts
expended under the medical plan, including amounts
expended for the husband/sole proprietor, are excludible from
income under section 105 as an amount received under an
accident or health plan. In this manner, the plan promoter
attempts to convert an otherwise nondeductible personal
expense into a deductible business expense that is also
excludible from the recipient's income. The IRS identified
three challenges to the deduction: (1) the employer-employee
relationship is a sham, established only for tax avoidance
purposes; (2) the employer-employee relationship is actually
a partnership; and (3) payments under the plan are not
intended to benefit the spouse as an employee. The IRS
acknowledged that each situation had to be judged on its
separate facts. See also Harl, “More Guidance on Section 105
Plans,” 10 Agric. L. Dig. 65 (1999); Harl, “Effective Date of
Section 105 Plans,” 6 Agric. L. Dig. 121 (1995). FSA 1993-
0331-1, March 31, 1993.
HOME OFFICE . During the tax year, the taxpayer
resigned from fulltime employment and actively sought
employment elsewhere. The taxpayer used a typewriter on
the kitchen table to write letters to prospective employers and
the taxpayer’s answering machine was used to record
messages from these contacts. No other use of the taxpayer’s
reside ce was exclusively used on a regular basis for
employment or a business. The court held that the taxpayer
was not ligible for home office-related deductions because
no par  of the residence was exclusively and regularly used
for a trade or business. Dixon v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1999-310.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS . The taxpayer
operated a business as sole proprietor. The taxpayer
transferred the business to two trusts and then formed an LLC
with the trusts as members. The taxpayer started treating all
former employees as independent contractors. In a chief
counsel’s advice memorandum, the IRS stated that the
taxpayer, the LLC or the trusts would not be able to treat the
former employees as independent contractors under the
“substantive consistency” test under I.R.C. § 530. This test
precludes consideration of any other factor used to determine
employee or independent contractor status. CCA Ltr. Rul.
9936003, April 7, 1999.
IRA . The taxpayers, husband and wife, originally owned
separate IRAs. The taxpayers executed a marital agreement
which made the husband’s IRA marital property. The
taxpayers intended to split the husband’s IRA into two shares
and transfer one share to the wife’s IRA. The IRS ruled (1)
the reclassification of the husband’s IRA as marital property
was not a taxable distribution, but (2) the transfer of the
wife’s interest in the IRA to the wife’s IRA was a taxable
distribution because the ownership of the IRA was
determined when the IRA was established. Ltr. Rul.
9937055, June 24, 1999.
INTEREST . In this ruling, the taxpayer timely filed a 1995
tax return which showed a refund. The return was filed under
an extension such that the refund was not claimed until
estimated tax payments were made for 1996 and the taxpayer
elected to have the claimed refund applied to the next
installment of estimated taxes. However, the IRS
subsequently determined that the refund claim was too high
nd assessed a deficiency for 1995. The issue was how to
ass ss interest on the deficiency. The IRS ruled that, when a
taxpayer elects to apply an overpayment to the succeeding
year's estimated taxes, the overpayment is applied to unpaid
installments of estimated tax due on or after the date the
overp yment arose, in the order in which the installments are
r quir  to be paid to avoid an addition to tax for failure to
pay estimated income tax under I.R.C. §§ 6654 or 6655 with
respect to such year. The IRS stated that it will assess interest
on a subsequently determined deficiency for the overpayment
year from the date that the overpayment is applied to the
succeeding year's estimated taxes. Rev. Rul. 99-40, I.R.B.
1999-__.
The taxpayers were assessed interest on tax deficiencies
associated with their business income. The taxpayers claimed
the interest as a business deduction, which the IRS
disallowed under Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T. The Tax Court had
invalidated the regulation and allowed the deduction based on
Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 31 (1996), rev'd, 141
F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 1998). The appellate court, citing the
majority of contrary decisions, reversed, holding that interest
on tax eficiencies was not deductible no matter what the
154 Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM).
source of the tax was. Kikalos v. Comm’r, 99-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,823 (7th Cir. 1999).
INVOLUNTARY EXCHANGES . The taxpayer operated
a farm which included crops from perennial plants and trees.
The taxpayer claimed that the crops, soil and buildings were
contaminated by a defective herbicide which caused
destruction of the plants and required replacement of the
plants, an extensive cleaning of the buildings and
replacement of all soil. The taxpayer sued the herbicide
manufacturer for economic and punitive damages, fees and
costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest. The taxpayer
received an award but the parties reached a settlement
agreement for all damages. The taxpayer sought a ruling that
the damage to the farm was an involuntary conversion,
allowing deferral of gain to the extent the award proceeds
were reinvested in similar property. The IRS ruled that the
damage suffered by the taxpayer was similar to the cattle
poisoning in Rev. Rul. 54-395, 1954-2 C.B. 143, loss of
honeybees from pesticides in Rev. Rul. 75-381, 1975-2 C.B.
25, and contamination of fresh water sand by salt water in
Rev. Rul. 66-334, 1966-2 C.B. 302. Thus, the IRS ruled that
the taxpayer’s plants were destroyed sufficient to constitute
an involuntary conversion by the herbicide, allowing the
taxpayer to qualify for involuntary conversion treatment of
the settlement proceeds reinvested in similar property. Ltr.
Rul. 9937050, June 22, 1999.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES . The taxpayers sought like-
kind exchange treatment for the sale of real estate and the
purchase of other real estate. The issue was whether the
taxpayers had identified the exchange property within 45
days after the sale of the first property. The taxpayers claimed
to have made the identification between themselves. The Tax
Court found this statement to be untrue because the evidence
demonstrated that the taxpayers had discussions about the 45
day period with real estate agents and tax advisors, yet the
taxpayers did not inform these advisors about the
identification of any replacement property within the 45 days.
Thus, the court held that the taxpayers were not eligible for
the like-kind exchange treatment for the transactions. The
appellate court affirmed in an opinion designated as not for
publication. Dobrich v. Comm’r, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,826 (9th Cir. 1999).
NET OPERATING LOSSES. The taxpayer corporation
timely filed a return for 1992 which incorrectly showed
taxable income. In 1994, the taxpayer filed an amended
return which showed a net operating loss. The taxpayer
sought to elect to waive the carryback period for the net
operating loss, under I.R.C. § 172(b)(3). The temporary
regulations allow the election to be made on an amended
return. The court held that the election had to be made by an
original or amended return by the due date of the return plus
extensions. Therefore, because the election was not made
until after the due date for the return, the taxpayer could not
make the election to waive the carryback of net operating
losses. Diesel Performance, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1999-302.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM  § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. A non-tax matters
partner had filed a petition for readjustment of partnership
items. The tax matters partner sought permission to amend
the petition to add the defense of equitable recoupment,
arguing that a time-barred refund item should be allowed
against a current tax deficiency claimed in the administrative
adjustment proceeding. The court held that equitable
recoupment could not be raised in an administrative
adjustment proceeding because the recoupment issue was not
a partnership level item. Crop Associates–1986 v. Comm’r,
113 T.C. No. 15 (1999).
DISTRIBUTIONS. Two corporations formed an LLC for
the purpose of remodeling existing and constructing new
business property. One corporation contributed assets and the
other contributed cash. In order to equalize the capital
contributions, some of the cash was distributed to the other
corporation. In a field service advice ruling, the IRS ruled
that the transaction would not be recast as a sale because the
distribution was not made with the principal purpose of
reducing substantially the present value of the partners'
aggregate federal tax liability in a manner inconsistent with
the inte t of subchapter K. FSA Ltr. Rul. 9936011, June 3,
1999.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
INCOME. The taxpayer claimed rental income from renting
most of the taxpayer’s residence to a wholly-owned S
corporation which provided economic research and
marketing performed by the taxpayer. The rental income and
deduction were disallowed because the taxpayer failed to
substantiate the fair rental value of the property and the actual
payment of the rent by the corporation. Young v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1999-303.




AFR 5.54 5.47 5.43 5.41
110 percent AFR 6.11 6.02 5.98 5.95
120 percent AFR 6.67 6.56 6.51 6.47
Mid-term
AFR 6.02 5.93 5.89 5.86
110 percent AFR 6.63 6.52 6.47 6.43
120 percent AFR 7.25 7.12 7.06 7.02
Long-term
AFR 6.31 6.21 6.16 6.13
110 percent AFR 6.95 6.83 6.77 6.73
120 percent AFR 7.59 7.45 7.38 7.34
Rev. Rul. 99-41, I.R.B. 1999-__.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer purchased several
acres of land and built a residence on the land. The taxpayer
sold th  property at a gain and purchased another parcel of
unimproved land for less than the sales price of the first
parcel. The taxpayer alleged that half of the proceeds of the
sale of the first property was received by third party owners,
but the taxpayer provided no evidence other than a title
insurance statement. The court held that the taxpayer
recognized capital gain from the sale of the residence.
Johnson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-312.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME . The taxpayers,
husband and wife, each owned farm land. The wife rented her
farm land to the husband for a fair rental amount. In each of
the years in issue, the wife entered into a purported
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employment agreement with the husband. The agreement
said that, with respect to the husband's business of farming,
the wife was to perform bookkeeping, run errands for the
business, and help with livestock chores and field work. In
essence, the agreement memorialized almost the same duties
that the wife had been performing since the taxpayers began
farming together. The agreement also stated that the wife
could participate in her husband's health and accident
insurance plan, according to the terms and provisions of that
plan. The wife would have continued to do the same farming
jobs even if there had been no agreement. The husband
claimed that he made all the farm management decisions. The
wife reported the rental income from her land on Schedule E
of their joint returns and did not include it in self-
employment income (for income tax purposes)but the wife
included employment income for her services to the husband
in operating the farm. The court found that the wife
performed her services for the farm under an arrangement
and materially participated in the farm operation; therefore,
the court held that the rental income from the leasing of the
land to the farm operation was self-employment income.
Hennen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-306.
TAX CREDITS . The IRS has issued a description of the
Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) under I.R.C. § 51 and
the extension of the Welfare-to-Work (WtW) Tax Credit
under I.R.C. § 51A and clarifies their operation where an
individual is employed by more than one employer in the
process of moving from welfare to work. Notice 99-51,
I.R.B. 1999-__.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
SECURITY INTEREST OR LEASE . The debtor entered
into an irrevocable 84 month lease of 15 installed swine
nursery buildings, valued at $925,000 at the beginning of the
lease. The lease payments would total $1,281,987 and the
debtor had the option to purchase the buildings at lease end
for $46,250. The court found that the property would have a
fair market value of $225,000 at the lease end. Under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 1-201(37), a lease is considered a security
transaction if the lessee cannot terminate the lease and the
lessee has the option to purchase the leased goods for
nominal consideration. The court held that the $46,250 option
price was nominal compared to the amount of lease
payments, the initial value of the property and the lease end
value of the property; therefore, the lease was held to be a
security transaction. In re Super Feeders, Inc., 236 B.R. 267
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1999).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
RICE PROMOTION ASSESSMENT. The plaintiffs were
rice buyers who were subject to an assessment on rice
purchases by the Arkansas Rice Research and Promotion
Board. The assessment occurred only after approval of the
rice producers in the state, although no rice buyer participated
in the vote. The assessed funds were used for the promotion
of rice and market development. The rice buyers argued that
the assessment was an unauthorized delegation of legislative
authority to the rice producers to make an assessment against
rice buyers without the approval of the rice buyers. The court
held that the assessment was an unconstitutional delegation
of legisl ive authority to make assessments. Leathers v.
Gulf Rice Arkansas, Inc., 994 S.W.2d 481 (Ark. 1999)
STATE TAXATION
PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS. The state of
Arkansas had assessed and collected state sales and income
taxes from the defendants, production credit associations
(PCAs). The defendants sought a refund of the taxes, arguing
that th  PCAs were exempt from state taxation as federal
instrumentalities. Under M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316
(1819), federal instrumentalities are immune from state
taxation unless Congress expressly waives such immunity.
The state argued that Congress amended 12 U.S.C. § 2077,
leaving out an express exemption for PCAs’ capital, reserves,
surplus, and other funds and income. The state argued that
this amendment implied that the Congress was waiving the
immunity for PCAs as to these items. The court held that the
waiver of immunity from taxation required an express waiver
in a statute; therefore, the immunity of the PCAs remained
and they were not subject to state taxation. State v. Farm
Credit Services of Central Arkansas, 994 S.W.2d 453
(Ark. 1999).
VALUATION . The plaintiff owned farm land which had
received an increase in valuation for real property taxation.
The county assessed the land higher because the soil type was
considered irrigable and the plaintiff had a water right to
sufficient water. The plaintiff appealed the valuation
administratively and to the circuit court which held the
valuation method to be improper because it focused on
arbitrary standards and did not take into account other factors
of irrigation such as the slope of the land and the availability
of the water at all times.  The following year, the plaintiff’s
land again received a higher valuation as irrigable land and
the plaintiff filed administrative and judicial appeals. In
support of a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
argued that the previous judicial decision was binding on the
county and required the county to not base valuation on the
irrigability of the land and the availability of irrigation water
rights. The circuit court granted the summary judgment, but
the appellate court reversed, holding that the county had
demonstrated that it had used a different method of valuation
and took into account the factors required by the first appeal.
The appellate court held that an issue of fact remained as to
the method used to value the plaintiff’s land. Shevling v.
Butte Couty Bd. Of Comm’rs, 596 N.W.2d 728 (S.D.
1999).
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FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 24-28, 2000
Royal Lahaina Resort, Kaanapali Beach, Island of Maui, Hawai’i
Celebrate the Millenium by leaving winter behind and spending a week in Hawai'i in January 2000! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand Kaanapali beach and the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-
class seminar on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Prof. Roger A. McEowen.  The
seminar is scheduled for January 24-28, 2000 at the spectacular ocean-front Royal Lahaina Resort on the island of
Maui, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each day, Monday through Friday, with plenty of time to golf,
play tennis or just lie in the warm Hawaian sun. A continental breakfast and break refreshments for each day are
included in the registration fee,  Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 500 page seminar manual, Farm
Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior to the seminar. A CD-ROM
version will also be available for a small additional charge.
     Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business  deduction
(FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of
both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts and medicaid trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares and insure availability of convenient flights at a
busy travel time of the year. Attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the Royal
Lahaina Resort, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law
Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law. The registration fee for nonsubscribers is $695.
Subscribers should receive their brochure soon. Look for it in your mail.
Call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958 or e-mail: aglaw@aol.com, if you need a brochure for this seminar or want to register.
